主题：Pivots and Prestige Venture Capital Contracts with Experimentation
主讲人：Martin Szydlowski，明尼苏达大学卡尔森管理学院皇冠足球比分学助理教授
时间：4月7日（周三）上午10:00-11:30
地点：4-101教室
语言：英文
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摘要：
We study venture capital financing with experimentation. An entrepreneur contracts with an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation by both parties to succeed. In equilibrium, investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous information and from the entrepreneur’s contract offers. The optimal contract features vesting and dilution, consistent with empirical evidence. Pivots and prestige projects emerge as signaling devices. Technological progress, which lowers the cost of experimentation or which increases the rate of learning, makes entrepreneurs pivot more aggressively in equilibrium.
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主讲人介绍：
Martin Szydlowski is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. His research examines how agency conflicts influence firm investment, capital structure, and the optimal mix of managerial incentives. He also studies the impact of ambiguity aversion on incentive contracts. Martin is teaching corporate finance to both undergraduate and PhD students. He holds a PhD in Economics from Northwestern University and a Diploma?from the University of Mannheim, Germany.