主题：Disclosure of Bank-specific Information and the Stability of Financial Systems
主讲人：Ming Yang，伦敦大学学院经济学与皇冠足球比分学副教授
时间：11月24日（周三）下午4:30-6:00
地点：4-101教室
语言：英文
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摘要：
We find that disclosing bank-specific information reallocates systemic risk, but whether?it mitigates systemic bank runs depends on the information disclosed. Disclosure reveals banks’ resilience to adverse shocks, and shifts systemic risk from weak to strong?banks. Yet, only disclosure of banks’ exposure to systemic risk can mitigate systemic?bank runs because it shifts systemic risk from more vulnerable banks to those less vulnerable. Optimal disclosure thus maximally differentiates such exposure, provided that?banks experience runs simultaneously, if inevitable. Disclosure of banks’ idiosyncratic?factors does not differentiate such exposure, rendering the resulting reallocation of systemic risk ineffective in mitigating systemic runs. In the context of disclosing stress-test?results, when the quality of the banking system deteriorates, the regulator may have?to face a sudden run on a huge mass of banks rather than gradually abandoning weak?banks.
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主讲人介绍：
Ming Yang?is?an Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at UCL. He?works?on various topics in finance, economics, and accounting, which share the central theme of strategic information acquisition and disclosure. In particular, He?studies?i) the interplay between security design and information acquisition in corporate finance, ii) the role of information acquisition and disclosure in supporting coordination, iii) incentive contract and monitoring, iv) accounting and optimal information disclosure, etc. His?work includes papers published in the Review of Economic Studies, the Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, and the Journal of Accounting and Economics.